Over financial regulation and stability: Does it matters for bank efficiency in Nigeria? by ENEMONA, Joseph Onuche
Turkish Economic Review 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 8                    March 2021                                  Issue 1 
 
Over financial regulation and stability: Does it 
matters for bank efficiency in Nigeria? 
 
By Joseph Onuche ENEMONA1†aa 
 
Abstract. Banks play a key and critical role in society, mediating resources and assets 
around the economy between surpluses and household spending on deficits. Therefore, 
they have a great responsibility for sustainability and prosperity. This study is motivated 
by the need to investigate whether competition, regulation and stability are important for 
the efficiency of the Nigerian banking system. Data sourced from the World Development 
Indicators between 1996 and 2017 was used. The results show a negative and statistically 
significant relationship exists between financial regulation and efficiency of the banking 
sector. However, further results show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
exists between financial regulation and stability in the system. Thus, the study concludes 
by emphasizing the importance of stability and bank performance matters in Nigeria. 
Keywords. Bank efficiency, Financial regulation, Stability.  
JEL. D81, D91, E71, G01, G41, H11, I18, Z18. 
 
1. Introduction 
he financial crisis that ravaged the world in 2007 and 2008 led to a 
wave of re-regulation and further regulatory debate that resulted in 
the Banking regulation measures to avert financial crises and 
liquidity traps (Cao et al., 2020; Hassan et al., 2020; Doan et al., 2018). This 
article reviews the main debate surrounding regulations with a special 
focus on the Nigerian Financial System. The main objective of this study is 
to investigate whether or not over regulation existing practice is over 
regulaled. In addition, this review aims to uncover new information that 
could help to improve effective and efficient supervision without exposing 
the sector to external shocks due to over regulation.  
Further more, this issue of the reviewincludes articles on regulation of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and structural change in financial 
markets, looking back at the experience of Nigeria banking crises and also 
suggesting possible improvements to regulation and oversight. The review 
addresses the overall structure of regulation and thecrucial role that 
enhanced liquidity regulation will play.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents 
the background of the study and problem of regulation in the Nigerian 
Banking System and section 3 present the concept and theoretical flaws that 
call for, regulation. Section 4 present the trend analysis of the major 
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indicators of regulation with respect to the Nigerian Financial System. 
Section 4 conclude with policy suggestions.  
 
2. Background 
The global financial crisis between 2008 and 2010, experienced through 
cross national banking structures across countries, affected the global 
economy and has contributed to unforeseen implications. Some studies 
note that globalisation and excessive competition in financial sectors are 
important factors driving the financial crisis (Teichmann & Falker, 2020). 
Consequently, the effect of bank regulation and competition on financial 
stability has since drawn more attention from academics and policy 
makers. 
Before the transition period, banking sectors were largely state-
controlled, and lending practices showed a marked bias toward state-
owned companies, which are basically the only source of non-monetary 
budget deficit financing. Because of the government's implicit guarantee, 
banks were not motivated to control their risk. Consequently, they were 
saddled with a large number of bad loans concentrated in the public 
banking sector.  
 
 
Figure 2. Analysis of Regulation (Z-score) and Bank Efficiency (Lerner Index) 
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Figure 2. Trend Analysis of Regulation (Z-score) and Bank Efficiency (Lerner Index) 
 
Figure 1 and 2 depicts the analysis of regulations and bank efficiency. As 
observed from the trend analysis, it is clear that financial regulation and 
bank efficiency move in the same direction. Between 1996 and 1998, there 
was a slow and decrease in the pattern of both variables, while irregular 
movement was observed between 2000-2012. The flat shape pattern was 
observed between 2013 -2017. Overall, financial regulation and bank 
efficiency in Nigeria appears to be connected. 
Since the 1990s financial reforms have been introduced across transition 
countries, including the settlement of non-performing loans (LPNs), the 
privatization of state-owned banks, the incorporation of foreign investors 
and the restructuring of national bank structures. However, the financial 
system has always been procyclical, with easy availability of credit 
boosting growth in the upturn and with credit crunches often aggravating 
the downturn, and this feature was present notably in the subprime crisis. 
One underlying factor is that provisions are based on immediate risk of 
loss, so cushions are not built up in advance of recessions. There are three 
functions of regulation, the protection of the direct interest of the consumer 
through product regulation, the protection of the consumer against 
monopoly power through structural regulation and the indirect protection 
of the consumer through regulations designed to reduce spillover and 
contagion from damaging events such as bank failure. The first two 
functions may be described as micro prudential and the latter function as 
macro prudential. Bank regulation also has a number of layers of 
responsibility as well, with the overall framework being set by the central 
banks. 
 
3. The problem  
The advent of the new financial instruments and the search for a global 
financial system have led to a significant expansion of speculative activities, 
thereby making gambling an important feature of financial activities. This 
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has been a source of instability in many nations and has weakened the 
whole international economic system.  
There are fives shortcomings of this search for financial liberalization 
and the advent of new financial instrument are below. First, financial 
market operation are flawed in that many successful operations are largely 
derived from group behaviour. Second, the prices in stock and capital 
markets often overshoot, which creates the potential for bubbles. Third, the 
emergence of a largely unregulated shadow financial system and the 
growth of financial institutions of systemic significance have generated 
systemic risk within financial markets in the sense that one institution's 
failure could cause a global financial crisis (Allen & Gu, 2018). Fourth, 
banks levy many other charges, such as fees for a check book or an ATM 
card. More than 20 percent of banks report other types of account-opening 
charges. Bank charges on maintenance fees also reduce the number of bank 
account. Fifth, charges for remittances are another form of cost that reduces 
bank usage. The higher the fee charged for receiving a foreign draft, the 
lower the number of accounts per thousand adults. 
Given the trend towards growing regulatory risk for financial 
institutions, it is topical to shed light on the justification for financial 
regulation, with the focus on separating expectations from facts. In reality, 
today's highly competitive and dynamic financial markets will 
undoubtedly need a robust regulatory structure to rectify market 
imperfections, with blurred boundaries. Accordingly, this article will 
address the core elements of the financial regulation argument along with 
the myths and truths about modern financial regulation. In Nigeria 
Banking System, large-scalemalpractices, lack of transparency and 
accountability have become so bad that every bank has become an 
institution from which the economy is sapped and maimed. The situation 
becomes worrisome as politicians and historians are major functionaries in 
our banking institutions, simply because of the lack of professionalism in 
the Nigeria banking system.  
 
4. Literature review 
4.1. Theoretical framework  
In the extant literature, financial regulation can be theorised in two 
ways. The first characterzes contends that financial regulation or panic are 
undesirable random event that often have resultant effects on the real 
economy variables (Allen et al., 2009; 2017). For example, panics are 
incidents of self-fulfilment. Agents have unpredictable consumption 
requirements, and it is expensive to liquidate long-term investments. The 
second theory suggests that banking stability is not random events, but 
natural condition attached to business cycle trends (Friedman & Schwartz, 
1962; Gorton, 1988). The theory is that an economic downturn will decrease 
the valuation of bank assets, increasing the risk that banks will not be able 
to fulfill their obligations. Allen & Gu (2018) identify six consequences of 
systemic risks attached to micro prudential regulation which includes: (1) 
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panic banking crises; (2) banking crises which reduce asset value; (3) 
contagion; (4) financial planning; (5) foreign exchange distortion or 
exogenous shocks; (6) banking effect from uncertainty. Stein (2012) 
developed and identified various methods of financial stability which 
include fundamental market failure, and conventional market and open 
market externalities.  
 
4.2. Empirical review  
Several studies have examined the linked between financial regulation 
and stability with mixed evidence. For example, Sun (2020) measures the 
financial strength of the People Bank of China from the perspective of 
balance sheet and then examined whether financial strength affects it policy 
using econometric approach. The author results shows that resilient 
balance sheet is necessary for maintaining the financial strength in Chinese 
economy. Okahara (2018) proposes and develop a model for interaction 
between banks and creditors and reports that financial regulation requires 
bank disclosure of information about its capital structure which can hel 
stabilise the system. Baek (2017) recognised that financial intermediaries 
can disclose costly information about the value of their assets and that 
creditors depends on this information to form their expectations. 
Avgouleas & Xu (2017) highlighted five cardinal issues pertaining to 
financial regulation which includes; (a) bad lending system; (b) lax 
governance; (c) shadow banking system; (d) short term liquidity backstops; 
(e) lack of transparency. Admati et al. (2012) suggests that debt overhang 
and capital regulation are important factor in ensuring stability. 
Some studies suggest that although participating in non-lending 
activities helps banks diversify risk, lack of experience in new services can 
often lead to higher income volatility and greater instability. Strict capital 
standards can help enhance corporate governance for banks and mitigate 
risk-taking behaviour, although they are not generally correlated with 
lower loan losses (Li, 2019, Luo et al., 2016; Fries & Taci, 2005). Evidence has 
shown that greater supervisory control often contributes to more 
corruption in lending, and that this increases bank instability (Grigorian, & 
Manole, 2005; Barrell et al., 2010; Barrell & Davis, 2005). 
Earlier studies have shown a fragility of competitive banking systems. In 
a competitive banking environment, banks benefit less from the lending 
relationship, which discourages them from properly controlling the risk of 
borrowers and thus increases the risk (Djalilov & Piesse, 2016). It also 
implies that large banks in concentrated banking sectors will raise 
profitability and reduce financial uncertainty by having more "capital 
buffers" to withstand external macroeconomic and liquidity shocks (Battisti 
et al., 2020). 
Moreover, as regards the nexus of competition – fragility, while deposit 
insurance can alleviate bank volatility by preventing banks from 
insolvency, it also contributes to moral hazard by offering incentives for 
banks to participate in risk-taking activities. So, deposit insurance in a more 
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competitive market will increase bank instability (Acharya & Matthew, 
2010; Arch, 2020), and to prevent excessive risk taking in a competitive 
banking system, restrictions on deposit interest rates are important, which 
call for regulation (Agarwada, 2005; Adrian & Hyun, 2008). Some studies 
show that bank risks do not increase by using alternative methods of 
allocating risk exposure, even though market force promotes riskier 
portfolios of assets (Ahearne et al., 2002; Agbetsiafa, 2005; Ahuja et al., 
2010).  
Previous studies have shown mixed results regarding the effect of the 
banking sector reform on risk-taking behaviour. From the conventional 
point of view, financial liberalisation is commonly correlated with 
increased market competition, which in turn promotes increased risk-
taking and increased moral hazard problems (Ahrend et al., 2008; 
Agbetsiafa, 2011). Other scholars, however, have varying opinions, 
suggesting that banks are more likely to pursue economies of scale and 
reach and diversify income flows, thereby incurringless risky if liberalised 
(Akyuz, 2009). 
 
4.3. Hypothesis formulation 
In light of the above, the research questions this study seeks to address 
the following research question:  
 
Does Over financial regulation causes bank efficiency?  
 
The answer to this question will provide explanation for the ongoing 
debate around the potential impacts of financial over regulation on the 
system.  
 
5. Methodology  
5.1. Empirical model  
Following Luo et al. (2016), the estimated model connecting the financial 
regulation and bank efficiency is specified as: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 
 
Where, 𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) 
 
To control for other variables such as stability, capital market impact, 
economic impact. Thus, the model becomes:  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 𝐼𝑛𝑓, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝐼𝑛𝑡 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) (2) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑐𝑡) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠  
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Where:   
The bank regulation is measured by 𝑍 −  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 , which is specified below 
as: 
 
𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴      𝑖,𝑡 − (𝐸 𝐴 )𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑠𝑑 (𝑅𝑂𝐴      )𝑖,𝑡
  
 
where bank riskijtindicates bank i’s stability in year t and is measured as 
the logarithm of the Z-score (log Zscore); 𝑅𝑂𝐴      = moving average of return 
on asset; (𝐸 𝐴 )𝑖,𝑡  = ratio of equity to total asset; 𝑠𝑑 (𝑅𝑂𝐴      )𝑖,𝑡 = standard 
deviation of return on assets. 
Competition is measure by Learner Index expressed as:  
 





Where;  𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡  = indicates the output price (measure as total asset ratio for 
banks); 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡  = is the marginal cost of banks. 
 
5.2. Econometric model   
The Model in equation 2 is respecified as:   
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡 +
𝛼4 𝐼𝑛𝑡 − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  (3) 
 
Where, the parameter is denoted as 
𝛼0  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼1−4 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡. The 𝑒𝑡  is the error term. 
 
5.3. Data, sources and description  
The study used the annual data sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis and World Development Indicator. The period consider is 
between 1996 and 2017 and it was based on the available data for specific 
key indicators such as the Z-score which capture financial regulation and 
Lerner index which measure bank efficiency. 
 
Table 1. Variables, sources and definitions 
Variable Sources  Definition 
Financial regulation  
 (Z -Scores) 
FRED, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
 
It captures the probability of default of a 
country's banking system, calculated as a 
weighted average of the z-scores of a 
country's individual banks (the weights 
are based on the individual banks' total 
assets). Z-score compares a bank's buffers 
(capitalization and returns) with the 
volatility of those returns. 
It captures the probability of default of a 
country's banking system, calculated as a 
weighted average of the z-scores of a 
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country's individual banks (the weights 
are based on the individual banks' total 
assets). Z-score compares a bank's buffers 
(capitalization and returns) with the 
volatility of those returns. It is estimated 
as (ROA+(equity/assets))/sd (ROA); 
sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of 
ROA. (Calculated from underlying bank-
by-bank unconsolidated data from Bank 
scope). 
Bank Efficiency  
(Lerner Index) 
FRED, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
 
A measure of market power in the 
banking market. It compares output 
pricing and marginal costs (that is, mark-
up). An increase in the Lerner index 
indicates a deterioration of the competitive 
conduct of financial intermediaries. 
A measure of market power in the 
banking market. It is defined as the 
difference between output prices and 
marginal costs (relative to prices). Prices 
are calculated as total bank revenue over 
assets, whereas marginal costs are 
obtained from an estimated trans log cost 
function with respect to output. Higher 
values of the Lerner index indicate less 
bank competition. Lerner Index 
estimations follow the methodology 
described in Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez 
Pería (2010).  
Stability (Inflation) World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
Inflation as measured by the consumer 
price index. It reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services that may be fixed or 
change at specified interval, such as year. 
Market Capitalisation World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
Market capitalisation (also known as 
market value) is the price times the 
number of shares outstanding (including 
several classes) for listed domestic 
companies. It a measure of stock market 
size and can measure the well-functioning 
of financial market. 
Interest rate spread World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
The interest rate spread is the interest 
rate charged by banks on loan to private 
sector customers minus the interest rate 
paid by commercial similar banks for 
demand, time, or saving deposits. The 
terms and conditions attached to these 
rates differ by country. 
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6. Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical discussion of the estimated 
regression model and discussed the findings.  
6.1. Preliminary checks 
This section presents the preliminary checks which includes the 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. The aim is to explore the 
behaviour and relationship of the dataset before analysis is carried out. 
 
6.1.1. Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables are in Table 
2 and 3.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Fin-reg 7.08 20.0 14.5 3.3 22 
Lerne-index 0.1 0.33 0.23 0.05 22 
Inf 21.7 52 26.8 7.8 22 
Market cap 2.4 30.8 12.3 5.12 22 
Int-spread 2.3 15.5 6.9 3.02 22 
Source: STATA 12 Output 
 
Table 2 shows the summary of the descriptive statistics which includes 
the arithmetic mean and standard deviation. On average, the financial 
regulation and its corresponding standard deviation is reported as 14.5 
(3.3), followed by Lerner Index (Lerne-index), Inflation (Inf), Market 
capitalisation (Market cap), and interest spreads (Int-spread) which are 
reported as: 0.23 (0.05), 26.8 (7.8), 12.3 (5.12), and 6.9 (3.02). 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables Fin-reg Lerne-index Inf Market cap Int-spread 
Fin-reg 1     
Lerne-index -0.1 1    
Inf 0.4 -0.02 1   
Market cap 0.08 0.06 -0.12 1  
Int-spread 0.6 -0.4 0.02 0.28 1 
Source: STATA 12 Output. 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. The results show 
that negative relationship exist between Financial regulation and Lerner 
Index (Lerne-index), while other variables have positive relations with 
financial regulations.  
 
6.2. Main results 
This section presented the results of the estimated regression model on 
the relationship between financial regulation, bank efficiency, stability and 
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Table 4. Estimated Regression Model 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Bank Regulation (Fin reg) 

























Time (dummy) Inclusion Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared   0.63 
Adj.-R squared   0.55 
F-stat.   0.000 
Notes. T-statistic is reported in paratheses. *** Significance at 1% (two-sided) level.; ** Significance at 5% 
(two-sided) level. * Significance at 10% (two-sided) level. 
 
The results in Table 4 are presented in three folds. Frist, the Model 1 
shows the estimated results on the effect of bank efficiency, stability on 
financial regulation. From the results, bank efficiency has a negative 
relation with financial regulation, while positive effect was found between 
stability (inf) and financial regulation (Fin reg) and they are all statistically 
significant. Second, Model 2 check the effect of market capitalisation 
(Market cap) on financial regulation (Fin reg). the results show that market 
capitalisation has positive and statistically significant relations with 
financial regulation (Fin reg). Third, Model 3 consider the economic impact 
of regulation using the interest spread as indicator. The results show that 
positive relations exist between interest spread and financial regulation. 
The overall Adj.-R-squared is valued at 0.55, which implies that about 55% 
variation in the dependent variables is explained by the model. The F-
statistic of 0.000 shows that all the variables included are determinant of 
financial regulation. 
 
7. Conclusion remarks 
Financial regulation refers to the rules and laws firms operating in the 
financial industry, such as banks, credit unions, insurance companies, 
financial brokers and asset managers must follow. However financial 
regulation is more than just having rules in place – it’s also about the 
ongoing oversight and enforcement of these rules. 
The review shows that increasingly strict banking regulations are 
changing how financial institutions of all shapes and sizes conduct 
business. Similarly, the review shows that operation controls, capital 
regulation, official supervisory behaviour, private supervision and greater 
disclosure of financial statements are associated with higher bank stability 
provide empirical evidence that an effective banking regulatory system is 
critical to maintaining bank stability. 
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As far as banking regulations are concerned, both higher operation 
limits and more specific asset diversification guidelines improve bank 
stability, but this positive impact substantially weakens for banks with 
higher market power. In conjunction with greater market strength, more 
stringent capital requirements raise the risk of bank insolvency.   
Thus, tighter regulation is meant to boost performance, but one 
unintended result is that talented investment bankers are disincentivised. 
Some now gravitate towards smaller, lighter-regulated finance houses and 
private equity and investment funds. In addition, extraterritorial financial 
regulation is becoming more compelling, which reinforces the case for 
capital requirement for banks and legislation greater transparency. 
A number of further avenues for research relevant to the subject can be 
envisaged. To begin with, the study approaches central bank regulation 
from a legal perspective, and one of the key legal provisions concerns the 
organisational structure in which a central bank sit. A second avenue for 
further research is that the essential relationship between central bank 
regulation and financial stability requires more comprehensive 
interdisciplinary study, beyond the rule-based framework employed here. 
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